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JUDGING BY THE NUMBERS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE POWER OF
STORY*
Kenneth D. Chestek1

I will seek someone who understands that justice isn’t about some abstract legal
theory or footnote in a case book; it is also about how our laws affect the daily
realities of people’s lives — whether they can make a living and care for their
families; whether they feel safe in their homes and welcome in their own nation. I
view that quality of empathy, of understanding and identifying with people’s hopes
and struggles, as an essential ingredient for arriving at just decisions and outcomes.
–President Barack Obama2
[O]ur system will only be further corrupted as a result of President Obama’s views
that, in tough cases, the critical ingredient for a judge is the “depth and breadth of
one’s empathy.”
Sen. Jeff Sessions3
The recent retirement of Justice David Souter from the Supreme Court touched off a

*
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1

Clinical Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis. This article is based
on a presentation that the author made to the Once Upon a Legal Story (Chapter Two)
conference held at Lewis and Clark Law School in Portland, Oregon in July, 2009; I am grateful
for the excellent feedback and discussion by participants at that conference. I was assisted
during the design phase of my study by Profs. Ruth Anne Robbins, Richard Neumann and
Michael Smith, who helped me kick around ideas for how to isolate the “story” variable in order
to create a meaningful study. I also want to thank the combined Indiana Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals, and the Appellate Practice Committee of the Section of Litigation of the
American Bar Association, all of whom provided input to the design of the study. I also wish to
thank Profs. Ruth Anne Robbins, Ruth Vance and Laura Graham, who participated in a smallgroup session with me at the Legal Writing Institute’s 2009 Writer’s Workshop in Welches, OR;
the faculties at Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis and the Lewis and Clark School
of Law for providing valuable input after faculty colloquia; and Profs. Kathy Stanchi, Linda
Edwards and Susan Duncan for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank my research
assistants, Kelly Brummett (who managed the online survey expertly) and Shena Wheeler (who
provided valuable research assistance on the article itself).

2

Transcript of the daily press briefing of May 1, 2009, at which President Obama made an
unannounced visit to the press room podium.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Press-Briefing-By-Press-Secretary-Robert-Gibbs-5-109/ (viewed on August 17, 2009).

3

Comments to the Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings on the Sotomayor
nomination by the Hon. Jeff Sessions, July 13, 2009,
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3959&wit_id=515 (viewed on August 14,
2009).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1457947

public debate about the extent to which a judge’s personal history and experiences should,
or should not, inform his or her decision-making. President Obama said while campaigning
for office, and again upon learning of the impending vacancy, that “empathy” was a quality
he valued in a Supreme Court justice. Predictably, conservative Senators attacked this
statement as “code” for “biased judges.”4 But does this debate obscure a more basic reality:
that all judges’ perceptions are shaped by their own personal histories?
Modern thinking in brain science and cognitive psychology suggests that humans
cannot help but interpret the world they see through the lens of their personal
experiences.5 A more productive discussion, therefore, might begin from acknowledging
that fact, and then studying how those experiences might (or might not) inform the
application of legal principles to result in a just decision.
The role of empathy, or emotional reasoning,6 in judicial thinking is a controversial
question. But before we can fully address the proper role, if any, for emotional reasoning in
4

Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Republican of Utah, speaking on ABC's This Week Today in May, 2009,
called empathy a “code word for an activist judge” who would be “partisan on the bench.”
http://www.politicususa.com/en/Hatch-Obama-Code (viewed on December 10, 2009).The
subsequent nomination and debate over the confirmation of Judge Sonia Sotomayor continued in
the same vein; see remarks of Sen. Sessions, supra n. 3. But cf. Benjamin E. Bratman, A Defense
of Sotomayor’s “Wise Latina” Remark - with No Rewording Required,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20090717_bratman.html (Last visited Aug. 2, 2009)
(arguing that in employment discrimination cases, her background as a Latina could help her
imagine the perspective of a person claiming discrimination, as the law often requires a judge to
do).
Curiously, conservative Senators did not object to President George H.W. Bush’s endorsement of
Clarence Thomas as a “warm, intelligent person who has great empathy . . ..” White House
Briefing, July 1, 1991 (announcing Thomas nomination). [I found this on Nexis, I have no idea
how to cite it.]

5

See, e.g., Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error 96-97 (Penguin Books 1994), at 96-97; George Lakoff,
Whose Freedom? The Battle over America’s Most Important Idea 16 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux
2006), at 16 (describing how a person’s thinking is “constrained by the frames and metaphors
shaping your brain and limiting how you see the world.”)

6

Classical rhetoricians would refer to this as an “appeal to pathos.”
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judging, several preliminary questions need to be examined. First, are judges actually
influenced by pathos-based appeals? And, if so, by what mechanism does this influence
occur? If in fact judges are influenced by pathos-based appeals, and if we know how that
occurs, we will then be in a position to discuss whether this influence is a good thing, or
something to try to avoid.
One form of a pathos-based appeal is storytelling. Stories (which some scholars refer
to as “narrative reasoning”7) work because they allow readers to imagine for themselves
how the protagonist might be feeling, and relate that feeling to the readers’ own
experiences.8
This article focuses on the question of whether appellate judges are actually
influenced by the stories of the litigants who appear before them. Part I will describe what
I call the “DNA model of persuasion,” setting forth the hypothesis that logical
argumentation, while a necessary part of persuasion, is not sufficient by itself, and that
weaving a pathos-based appeal in the form of a story into a brief will produce a more
persuasive document. Part II of this article will describe a study that I devised and
implemented to test whether appellate judges find story argumentation persuasive; Part
III will present the results of the study. Part IV deals with possible objections to the
validity of the test and the sample collected. Part V will begin an analysis of what the data

7

Linda Holdeman Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic Imaginations in Legal
Discourse, 20 Leg. Studies Forum 1, 9-10 (1996).

8

Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, Minding The Law 30-31 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000),
at 30-31 (arguing that humans are predisposed to use narrative structure to construct meaning
out of the events of every day life); Michael J. Higdon, Something Judicious This Way Comes . . .
The Use of Foreshadowing as a Persuasive Device in Judicial Narrative, 44 U. Richmond L. Rev.
____ [forthcoming 2010], at [manuscript pp. 8-9] (collecting scholarship showing that readers of
narratives must actively engage the text in order to create meaning, thereby creating a powerful
opportunity to persuade).
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might mean. Among other things, I conclude that stories are indeed persuasive to appellate
judges and others, but also that recent law school graduates are not as impressed by
stories as more experienced lawyers (and judges) are. Finally, I suggest that stories are
helpful because, properly done, they evoke emotional responses within the reader that
seem more “real,” and hence believable, to the reader.
I.

The DNA Model for Persuasive Writing
Stories have gotten a bum rap. Most people think of “stories” as entertaining works

of fiction,9 lies or falsehoods.10 The prosecution in a criminal case is likely to characterize
the defendant’s version of events as a “story,” implying that it lacks credibility.
Yet intuitively, we know that stories persuade. Stories are inherently interesting.
We grow up listening to stories, and we learn to tell stories to each other.11 We are
entertained by stories. Politicians and public speakers often use stories to make points and
to teach, and often to persuade. A good story affects the listener, or the reader, at a gut
level. When the audience reacts in the way the storyteller intends, the reader will “get” the
message internally in a way that is profound. But are stories too “soft” or unreliable to
include in appellate briefs? To the extent that stories present an appeal to pathos, as
opposed to logos, are they inappropriate in appellate advocacy?
Some appellate judges claim that they are persuaded only by the legal argument,

9

Among the alternative definitions provided by Webster’s Dictionary are: “2 a : an account of some
incident or event; often: a tale written or told esp. [sic] for the entertainment of children;” “3 b: a
fiction that is shorter or has a more unified plot than the usual novel.” Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary (Unabridged) (G & C Merriam Co. 1961).

10

“6: fib, lie falsehood.” Id.

11

Storyteller Kendall Haven claims that stories go back 100,000 years in human history, even
predating written communication. Kendall Haven, Story Proof: the Science Behind the Startling
Power of Story (Libraries Unlimited 2007), at 3.
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not by any emotional appeal. Some reject the notion that emotional appeal has any place in
appellate advocacy.12 The rule of law, they claim, requires logical arguments, clearly and
neutrally applied. For example, Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor Bryan Garner argue
that “[a]ppealing to judges’ emotions is misguided . . .. Good judges pride themselves on the
rationality of their rulings and the suppression of their personal proclivities, including
most especially their emotions.”13 Instead of emotional appeals, they write, “persuasion is
possible only because all human beings are born with a capacity for logical thought. . . .
The most rigorous form of logic, and hence the most persuasive, is the syllogism.”14 Senior
Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert writes that a brief is “nothing more or less than an expanded
categorical syllogism . . .”15

12

Some United States Senators apparently agree; see comments of Sens. Jeff Sessions and Orrin
Hatch at nn. 3 and 4, supra.

13

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A Garner, Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges (Thomson
West 2008), at p. 32.
There is some evidence that Justice Scalia practices what he preaches. In a recent dissent from a
petition granting a writ of habeas corpus, he wrote:
This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted
defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court
that he is “actually” innocent.
In re Davis, 130 S.Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (emphasis in original).

14

Id. at 41. To be fair, Scalia & Garner do admit that
there is a distinction between an overt appeal to emotion and the setting forth of facts
that may engage the judge’s emotions uninvited. You may safely work into your
statement of facts that your client is an elderly widow seeking to retain her lifelong
home. But don’t make an overt, passionate attempt to play upon the judicial
heartstring. It can have a nasty backlash.
Id. at 32. Although the authors don’t explain why it is okay to make covert emotional appeals but
not overt ones, I do agree with this advice. See discussion at p. 48, infra.

15

Ruggero J. Aldisert, Winning On Appeal: Better Briefs and Oral Arguments (2d Ed.) (NITA 2003),
at p. 21. Judge Aldisert admits that trial lawyers often do, and probably should, rely on
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But is this formulation complete? Is there no room for judicial intuition,16 or any
form of emotional reasoning? In short, are stories inappropriate forms of argumentation?
My claim in this article (and one I have made elsewhere17), is that logic alone is not
the best method of persuasion. Rather, a sound legal argument combined with a strong
story will be more persuasive than the bare legal argument standing alone. At the trial
level, this is certainly true. As Prof. Robert Burns has noted, trial lawyers can
construct their case from a double helix of norms. One of those strands is
constituted by the law of rules. The other strand is constituted by the norms
that find their natural home within the life-world of the judge and jury.
These common sense norms are embedded primarily in the different sorts of
narratives that the trial lawyer may employ at trial, from the fully
characterized storytelling of the opening statement to the more Spartan
narratives of direct examination.18

“shamelessly emotional matters,” but he cautions the advocate “not [to] carry this stuff upstairs
to the appellate court.” Id. at 5. On the other hand, he does advise “that the statement of facts [in
an appellate brief should] command and retain the reader’s attention. Do not bore the judge. Do
not make the brief difficult to read. Do not clutter the narrative. Come closer to Ernest
Hemingway than Beltway bureaucratese.” Id. at 165. He also devotes a few paragraphs advising
lawyers to “tell a story in the facts sections of briefs.” Id. at 168.
16

Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit admits that
“[i]ntuition plays a major role in judicial as in most decision making . . ..” Richard A. Posner, How
Judges Think (Harvard University Press 2008), at 107. Judge Posner also quotes a recent
interview with current Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy in which Justice Kennedy
suggests that many judges begin with a “quick judgment[]” and then determine whether that
judgment “makes sense, if it’s logical, if it’s fair, if it accords with the law, if it accords with the
Constitution, if it accords with your own sense of ethics and morality.” Id. at 257.

17

Kenneth Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story, 14 J. Leg. Writing 127 (2008).

18

Robert P. Burns, Studying Evidence Law in the Context of Trial Practices, 50 St. Louis U. L.J.
1155, 1171 (2006); see also J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal
Persuasion, 14 Leg. Writing 53 (2008). One study of how trial judges decide cases discusses the
interplay of “intuitive” and “deliberative” reasoning processes (similar to the “story” and “logos”
threads). Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 1
(2007).
Jerome Bruner describes this dichotomy as follows:
There are two modes of cognitive function, two modes of thought, each providing
distinctive ways of ordering experience, of constructing reality. The two (though
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The image of a “double helix” DNA molecule provides a useful analogy with which to
visualize the persuasive process. To insure that decisions are based upon neutral
principles, evenly and predictably applied to any set of facts, the law requires a strictly
logical component; let’s call that the “logos strand” of the double helix. But pure logic is
insufficient in many types of decisionmaking, even at the appellate level. For example,
sometimes the legislature enacts a statute that gives the courts wide discretion to decide
cases, because the possible range of human conduct that might fall within the scope of the
statute is too vast for a legislative body to anticipate.19 In other situations, courts have
developed (either as part of the common law or in response to a broad grant of discretion in
interpreting statutory or constitutional law) tests that require judges to weigh various

complementary) are irreducible to one another. Efforts to reduce one mode to the
other or to ignore one at the expense of the other inevitably fail to capture the rich
diversity of thought. . . . A good story and a well-formed argument are different
natural kinds. Both can be used as means for convincing another. Yet what they
convince of is fundamentally different: arguments convince one of their truth, stories
of their lifelikeness. . . . [T]he structure of a well-formed logical argument differs
radically from that of a well-wrought story.
Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Harv. Univ. Press 1986), at 11. For a fuller
discussion of how narrative reasoning differs from logical reasoning, see Linda L. Berger, How
Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of
Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 259,
266-269 (2009).
19

The law abounds with examples of subjective tests that require consideration of more than just
logic. For example, sentencing decisions require a trial court to weigh individual characteristics
of the defendant in determining the appropriate sentence. See, e.g., Hayley Bennett and Tony
Broe, Judicial Neurobiology, Markarian Synthesis and Emotion: How Can the Human Brain
Make Sentencing Decisions? 31 Crim. L. J. 75 (2007). For another example, while the Sherman
Antitrust Act criminalizes the act of “monopoliz[ing]” or “attempt[ing] to monopolize, 15. U.S.C.
§ 2, it leaves the definition of the term “monopolize” to the courts, which have developed a vast
array of tests and criteria to help them differentiate between legal and illegal monopolies. See,
e.g., Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: a Century past and the Future, 75
Cal. L. Rev. 959 (1987).
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factors before rendering judgment.20 For example, balancing tests almost by definition
require reasoning processes beyond pure logic.21 (How much “weight” does a judge give to
the privacy interest of a criminal defendant in determining the reasonableness of a search
of his car?) Likewise, a “totality of the circumstances” test invites the judge to examine a
body of evidence to render a decision without specifying the logical rules required to
evaluate that evidence.22 In such cases, it seems that another form of reasoning must join
with the purely logical application of rules to allow the judge to make any decision at all.
For the purpose of this article, I will call this other form of reasoning “story
argumentation” or “story reasoning.”23 This becomes the second strand of the DNA
molecule. My hypothesis is that a brief that relies purely on a logos-based argument will be
lifeless, just as a single strand of the DNA molecule is incomplete. Winding in a solid story-

20

For example, employment discrimination law may require even an appellate judge to try to
imagine the impact of, for example, a hostile workplace on an individual victim. See Bratman,
supra n. 4.

21

See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (requiring courts to weigh the free
speech interests of public employees against the interests of their employers in efficient
operations in order to determine whether prior restraint of an employee’s speech is permissible).
See also Posner, supra n. 16, at 96-97 (“Emotion exerts a huge influence on how people translate
their experiences into beliefs, and so on the weights (critical to the balancing tests so widely used
in American law) that judges assign to the probable consequences of deciding a case one way or
the other.”)

22

Justice Scalia describes the “reasonable man” test as “the most venerable totality of the
circumstances test of them all.” Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chicago L. Rev.
1175, 1181 (1989). He suggests that, in a “rule of law” system, when all of the available legal
rules “have been exhausted and have yielded no answer, we call what remains to be decided a
question of fact . . ..” Id. But he notes that in some instances, including the determination of what
constitutes a “reasonable search” under the Fourth Amendment, courts have declared the
application of the “reasonable man” test to be a question of law for the court. But even he does
not suggest that such tests can be eliminated from the body of the law altogether: “We will have
totality of the circumstances tests and balancing modes of analysis with us forever-and for my
sins, I will probably write some of the opinions that use them. All I urge is that those modes of
analysis be avoided where possible . . ..” Id. at 1187.

23

Others have referred to this type of reasoning as “narrative rationality” (Rideout, supra n. 18) or
“narrative reasoning;” Edwards, supra n. 7 at 9.
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based argument will bring the brief to life.24
Many scholars and practitioners agree that briefs should tell a story.25 However,
judges don’t unanimously agree. Some judges suggest that the key to persuasion is good
logical argumentation;26 others admit that telling a good story is also helpful (although
most suggest that the “story” is told only in the fact section).27

24

Story, of course, is at its most fundamental level a pathos-based appeal. For the classical
rhetoricians who are wondering what happened to “ethos” in this model, think of the hydrogen
bonds which hold the two strands of the helix together in a DNA molecule and give the molecule
its shape. In much the same way, ethos binds together the logos and story strands of a good
argument.
The “double helix” analogy also works well in a related context: how law is taught in law
schools. The Carnegie Foundation’s recent report, “Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the
Profession of Law,” identifies three “apprenticeships” that all students should complete in order
to become fully functioning professionals. The first apprenticeship, which the authors designate
as the “intellectual or cognitive” apprenticeship, embodies “analytical reasoning, argument, and
research” (essentially a “logos strand”). The second apprenticeship “is to the forms of expert
practice shared by competent practitioners. . . . [S]tudents lean by taking part in simulated
practice situations, as in case studies, or in actual clinical experience with real clients.” (This is
directly comparable to the “story” or “pathos” strand.) The third apprenticeship develops the
“identity and purpose, [and] introduces students to the purposes and attitudes that are guided by
the values for which the professional community is responsible.” (These would be the “ethos”
bonds described above.) Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law
Page (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2007), at [Kindle location 427].

25

Brian Foley and Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use Fiction
Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 Rutgers L.J. 459 (2001); Robert J.
Kapelke, Some Random Thoughts on Brief Writing, Colo. Law, Colorado Lawyer, January 2003,
p. at 29 (“Good storytelling is a sound technique in brief writing, as in oral advocacy.”); see also
Steve Johansen, This Is Not the Whole Truth: the Ethics of Telling Stories to Clients, 38 Ariz. St.
L.J. 961, 962 (2006); Carolyln Grose, A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients’ Stories, 12
Clinical L. Rev. 329 (2006); Binny Miller, Telling Stories About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of
Narrative, 14 Geo. J. Legal. Ethics 1 (2000); Bret Rappaport, Tapping the Human Adaptive
Origins of Storytelling by Requiring Legal Writing Students to Read a Novel in Order to
Appreciate How Character, Setting, Plot, Theme, and Tone (CSPTT) Are As Important As IRAC,
25 Cooley L. Rev. 267 (2008). For a fuller listing of scholarly works that discuss the use of
narrative in legal persuasion, see Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion: An Annotated Bibliography, 6 J.
ALWD 75, 77-79 (2009).

26

See text accompanying nn. 13 and 15, supra.

27

Aldisert, supra n. 15, at 168; Jacques L. Wiener, Ruminations from the Bench: Brief Writing and
Oral Argument in the Fifth Circuit, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 187 (1995).(“Judges are human-even if some
of us may not exhibit all of the qualities of that species at all times-so you must demonstrate both
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II.

The Persuasion Study
There is little empirical data on what persuades judges. One study reports that

judges prefer briefs that are “essays with a clear train of thought” rather than “repositories
of all the information a judge might want to know.”28 Several other studies focus on what
judges think of the quality of the briefs they read.29 But no studies have attempted to
systematically measure the effect of story reasoning on a judge’s thought process.
In early 2009, I conducted a study in an attempt to fill that gap. I wrote a series of
test briefs in a hypothetical case and asked appellate judges,30 their law clerks and

why your client should win (the emotional element) and the proper legal way that your client can
win (the intellectual element).”); Patricia M. Wald, 19 Tips From 19 Years on the Appellate
Bench, 1 J. App. Practice and Proc. 7, 11 (1999) (“Make the facts tell a story. The facts give the
fix; spend time amassing them in a compelling way for your side but do not omit the ones that go
the other way.”); Alex Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff, 1992 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 325, 330 (1992) (“There is a
quaint notion out there that facts don’t matter on appeal—that’s where you argue about the law;
facts are for sissies and trial courts. The truth is much different. The law doesn’t matter a bit,
except as it applies to a particular set of facts.”)
Judge Posner suggests that
since judges in our system are [occasional] legislators as well as adjucicators, lawyers
should make a greater effort to present facts to judges—not so much the facts of the case,
the adjudicative facts, which most lawyers do emphasize, but rather the background or
general facts that influence a legislative decision (“legislative facts,” in the conventional
and in this instance useful terminology).
Posner, supra n. 16, at 118-19.
28

In the summer of 2000, Bryan Garner did a brief survey of 100 appellate judges, asking only if
they thought an appellate brief should be “an essay with a clear train of thought” or “a repository
of all the information that a curious judge might want to know about a case.” Of the 57 judges
who responded, 49 (86%) preferred an “essay with a clear train of thought,” none preferred the
“repository of all information,” while 8 (14%) thought neither formulation was quite right. Bryan
Garner, Judges on Briefing: A National Survey, 8 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 1 (2002).

29

Kristen K. Robbins, The Inside Scoop: What Federal Judges Really Think About the Way Lawyers
Write, 8 J. Leg. Writing 257, 260 (2002); Susan Hanley Kosse & David T. ButleRitchie, How
Judges, Practitioners, and Legal Writing Teachers Assess the Writing Skills of New Law
Graduates: a Comparative Study, 53 J. Legal Educ. 80 (2003).

30

I chose to limit my study to appellate courts, clerks and practitioners because that is the more
controversial arena. It may be more easily accepted that trial judges, who are asked to decide
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appellate court staff attorneys, appellate lawyers, and law professors to rate the briefs as
to how persuasive they were. My purpose (which I did not disclose to the test
participants31) was to measure whether a brief with a strong strand of story reasoning,
woven in with the logos-based argument, would be more persuasive than a “pure logos”
brief. I had two test hypotheses: (1) in general, a brief that included a strand of story
reasoning would be more persuasive than a pure logos argument, and (2) this effect would
be more pronounced if the brief-writer had a “hard case” to make. That is to say, if existing
law favored one side of the case, the brief writer on that side could safely rely on a purely
logos-based, or legal, argument, while the writer arguing for a change in the law would
have a greater chance of success by relying more heavily on the pathos-based, or story, line
of reasoning.
A.

What is a “story?”

I first need to define exactly what I mean by “story.” There are many potential
definitions, most of which are too general or vague to be of much analytical value.32 The
definition that I used for this study is one crafted by professional storyteller Kendall
Haven:

individual cases based upon specific individual characteristics, sometimes gleaned from direct
observation of witnesses and parties in their courtrooms, may be more attentive to personal
characteristics and the “stories” of the persons who appear before them. Appellate judges,
however, are more removed from the disputes and the parties who inhabit those disputes, so that
individual “stories” are less likely to be important. See Aldisert, supra n. 15, at 5.
31

The instructions sent to all participants said only that “This study is an attempt to measure
empirically what technique or techniques might lead to more persuasive writing.” Instructions to
participants, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1421494.

32

One typical “defintion” is that “a story has a beginning, a middle, and an end.” Haven, supra n.
11, at 12. But that definition is far too simplistic. By that definition, the sentence “I went to the
store and bought a gallon of milk” is a complete “story,” even though standing alone it is of no
great interest to the reader and conveys little or no information that is useful.

-11-

Story: n.: A detailed, character-based narration of a character’s struggles to
overcome obstacles and reach an important goal.33
Haven contrasts “stories” with “information-based narratives,” which he defines as
narratives that “provide just the new essential information and assume the reader has
adequate banks of relevant topical prior knowledge to create context and meaning . . .”.34
What distinguishes “stories” from mere “information-based narratives,” then, is that
stories focus on characters, their goals, and their struggles to achieve their goals. Stories
need sufficient context to allow the reader to fully see and understand why the participants
in the story behaved as they did, and what they were trying to accomplish in the face of
various obstacles. The word “story,” therefore, refers to a method of structuring
information in a form that a reader will find engaging.35
The need to provide context, however, leaves the writer of an appellate brief in a
quandary. Many jurists who have written about what they like to see in briefs emphasize
concision.36 Justice Antonin Scalia and Prof. Bryan Garner urge caution in including

33

Haven, supra n. 11, at 79. Other storytellers use a similar definition; see, e.g., Annette Simmons,
The Story Factor: Secrets of Influence from the Art of Storytelling (Basic Books 2001), at 31(“a
story is a narrative account of an event or events—true or fictional. The difference between
giving an example and telling a story is the addition of emotional content and added sensory
details in the telling. A story weaves detail, character, and events into a whole that is greater
than the sum of its parts.”)

34

Id. Using these definitions, the sentence “I went to the store and bought a gallon of milk” is an
information-based narrative rather than a story, because it provides no information about the
actor, the struggle of the actor, or the actor’s goals. To be a complete story, much more context
about the actor’s struggle to obtain milk, and why he needed it, would be necessary.

35

Haven, supra n. 11, at 15.

36

Aldisert, supra n. 15, at 25-28 and 234-235 (collecting comments from appellate judges
emphasizing concision); Scalia, supra n. 13, at 23-25; see also Kosse & ButleRichie, supra n. 29,
at 85 (noting that their survey of state and federal judges, and other groups, revealed that judges
ranking clarity and concision as the two most essential elements of good legal writing).
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“sympathetic facts that are legally irrelevant.”37 Many appellate court rules require the
statement of facts section of an appellate brief to include “relevant facts,” perhaps
excluding by implication legally irrelevant facts.38 But the context necessary to create a
complete story (e.g., the details needed to develop the litigants’ character and goals)
frequently requires the inclusion of background details that are legally irrelevant, yet
necessary for the reader to completely understand what is going on.39 How can an attorney
attempting to tell the client’s story include such detail without annoying the court, or (even
worse) risking a sanction for violating the applicable rules of appellate procedure?
B.

The test briefs

For my study, I attempted to write two “information-based narratives” (which I will
refer to below as the “logos briefs”) and two “story briefs.” Each pair of briefs addressed
opposite sides of a hypothetical case in a fictional jurisdiction. Writing these briefs proved
to be the most difficult part of this project.40
Because one of my hypotheses for this study was that stories would have more
impact in a case where the law was weak, the fictional case I created involved a hard case:
A county in the fictional state of West Dakota had adopted (by voter referendum) an

37

Scalia & Garner, supra n. 13, at 94.

38

See, e.g., F. R. App. P. 28(a)(7); In. R. App. P. 46 (A)(6) (requiring the Statement of the Facts to
“describe the facts relevant to the issues presented for review”); In re Michael G., 311 N.W.2d 600
(Wis. 1981) (in a state with a rule identical to F.R. App. P. 28(a)(7), criticizing the state’s brief for
including background facts that were not legally relevant to the narrow issue before the court).

39

Storyteller Annette Simmons points out that facts which some persons might consider “irrelevant
details” may be highly useful because of their ability to trigger emotional reactions in the
listener. “Just because we cannot draw a linear connection of relevance does not mean that a
sensory detail is not connected in a nonlinear way to choices we make.” Simmons, supra n. 33, at
96.

40

Profs. Ruth Anne Robbins and Richard Neumann provided very helpful comments on the test
briefs.
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ordinance purporting to prohibit corporations from seeking to influence local government
officials, on the theory that corporations are not “persons” protected by either the United
States or West Dakota Bill of Rights. The corporate defendant, a retail hardware store, had
the “easy case” to make (reliance on the doctrine of stare decisis and a 130-year-old
Supreme Court precedent), while the county had a much harder case to make (seeking to
overturn that long-settled principle of law).41
The logos briefs were intentionally spare; they provided just the legally relevant
facts (the “new essential information”) and focused tightly on the legal precedents and
logical reasoning (the “relevant topical prior knowledge”). For example, the statement of
the case in the logos briefs for both the hardware store and the county recited these bare
but legally relevant facts: that the county voters had adopted Proposition 3 (the measure
which purported to deprive corporations of the right of free speech); that the hardware
store had sought a rezoning for a parcel of land; that it had purchased a full-page
advertisement in the local newspaper seeking to gain popular support among the local
citizens for the rezoning request; that the rezoning request had been denied; and that
because the advertisement violated the ordinance, the county had levied a fine as specified
in the remedial provisions of Proposition 3. While the store’s and the county’s briefs varied
some of the word choices, sentence structures and selection of the facts in order to put more

41

Some may dispute that this scenario is really a “hard case” at all, since the rules of stare decisis
are well-settled and the legal rule at issue in this case, the doctrine of “corporate personhood,” is
universal and long-standing. However, such analysis reflects what I would call “law-oriented
thinking,” since it proceeds from an assumption that the law is primary and correct and only
needs to be applied to specific facts. In terms of “fact-oriented thinking,” however, the
hypothetical scenario is a hard case because the party on the short end of the law, the local
residents of Old Orleans, seem to have a valid interest in preserving the character of their home
town, but have to fight an uphill battle against well-financed adversaries.
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emphasis on the facts each side felt were more helpful to their sides,42 the end result was
that the statements of facts in the two logos briefs were pretty similar.
The fact sections of the story briefs, however, were very different. In both briefs, I
spent some time developing a “baseline” for the story: a satisfying pre-existing condition
that was lost when the controversy arose.43 For example, the county’s brief described the
county seat (the locale for the zoning controversy) as an emerging artistic community:
Almost all of the remaining manufacturing or industrial jobs in the
region are located within the Borough of Old Orleans, in an industrial park
on the southeast side of the borough. Due to the recent decline in
manufacturing jobs, however, more than one third of the structures in that
park are now vacant and are deteriorating. The downtown commercial
district remains relatively vibrant, however. About ten years ago, there had
been a noticeable decline in commercial activity downtown, with numerous
vacant storefronts appearing. In the past three or four years, many of those
vacant storefronts have been replaced with art galleries, craft shops,
restaurants, or other stores catering to tourists and the growing artist
community.44
Note that this description, while delivered in facially neutral language (i.e. does not include
intensifiers or overblown rhetoric), evokes an image of a pleasant little village, struggling

42

For example, the brief for the store described the penalty imposed by the District Attorney as
“ten times the cost of the advertisement,” while the brief for the county described the penalty as
“the fine required by section 5 of Proposition 3.”

43

Amsterdam & Bruner describe the arc of a well-crafted plot as having five stages: (1) an initial
condition of tranquility which (2) is disrupted by some “Trouble,” leading to (3) efforts to
remediate the Trouble, (4) so that the original condition of tranquility can be restored, or a new
condition of tranquility is created, (5) ending with some coda or moral of the story. Amsterdam &
Bruner, supra n. 8, at 113-114. Others have described the arc of a plot as (1)
introduction/exposition (describing the initial condition of stasis), (2) a complicating incident and
rising action (the conflict arises), (3) a climax (at which point the protagonist is at maximum
peril), (4) resolution/falling action (in which the complication is resolved), and (5) the
denouement. See, e.g., Chestek, supra n. 17, at 147.

44

Respondent brief 2 at 3. (All four briefs can be downloaded from SSRN at this link:
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1421900.) [Alternatively: (All four briefs are reproduced as
Appendix A to this article.)]
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to re-invent itself in the face of a declining industrial base.45 It not only provides a glimpse
of what the county is trying to protect, but subtly suggests that this vision is worth
protecting. The “important goal” for the protagonist (the county) is set up.
The “obstacle” then appears:
In early 2007, BiggBox Lumber Company acquired an option to
purchase a vacant tract of land in Wetmarsh Township, about five miles
south of the downtown area of Old Orleans. The land is near an interchange
of Highway 81, the main highway into the Lost River Recreation Area. Since
the land is currently zoned AR-1 Agricultural, BiggBox applied to the
township zoning board for a rezoning of the property to C-1 Commercial.
The Old Orleans Industrial Development Agency, which has been in
charge of the efforts to redevelop the vacant sawmill site in the borough,
then approached BiggBox in an attempt to show BiggBox that the site was
large enough and needed no rezoning in order to accommodate BiggBox’s
needs. It also put together a favorable tax-free financing package and other
incentives hoping to convince BiggBox to locate within the borough.
However, BiggBox rejected these overtures and pursued its strategy to
obtain a rezoning of the Wetmarsh property. Part of its strategy in seeking
this goal was to purchase a full-page ad in the Old Orleans Gazette, the
weekly newspaper in the region, seeking to persuade both the local residents
and the Wetmarsh Township officials that the rezoning would be in the best
economic interest of the township.46
In terms of plot development,47 the newspaper advertisement constitutes the “complicating
incident” that upsets the pre-existing condition of stasis and gives rise to the conflict that
drives the story forward. Note that the town is portrayed in a favorable light (for example,
by proposing a reasonable alternative to the hardware store that the town believed would

45

Does this excerpt conjure up an image of a town that you know of? At the LWI Writer’s Workshop
in Welches, OR in July 2009, I asked various participants to read this passage and see if it
evoked the image of any real town they knew of. Every participant was able to name a real place
they saw in their head; two participants who were from the same state even came up with the
very same small town.

46

Respondent Brief 2, at 3-4.

47

See Chestek, supra n. 17, at 147-150.
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satisfy the goals of both parties). Conversely, the hardware store is subtly portrayed
negatively, as “rejecting” the reasonable compromise proposed by the town and
intentionally violating the County ordinance by appealing directly to the town’s residents.
Yet once again the language is understated and free from intensifiers or overblown
rhetoric; the reader is left to imagine the scene that the writer intends to portray.
The story brief for the hardware store uses similar techniques to create a favorable
image. It also sets up a “baseline” condition of stasis:
BiggBox Lumber Co., Inc., is the nation’s fourth largest retail outlet
for hardware and home improvement supplies. Its business model is to locate
primarily in smaller communities which are not served by either of the two
largest companies, Home Depot and Lowe’s. In order to remain price
competitive in the home improvement market, its operating margins are
somewhat smaller than those of its larger competitors.
BiggBox operates three stores in West Dakota, and has filed all of the
necessary registration statements to allow it to do business within the state.
Early in 2007, BiggBox identified Old Orleans and the Lost River Valley area
of West Dakota as a market not served by either Home Depot or Lowe’s, but
large enough to support a BiggBox retail store.48
Once again, an image is created: a small (by comparison) company trying to eke out a
living in smaller communities that the “big boys” ignore, thus providing a valuable service
to an underserved community.
The hardware store then subtly attempts to portray itself as the reasonable party in
the dispute, and the town as officious intermeddlers. After describing its business model in
the language quoted above, the store wrote:
[BiggBox] conducted a market study and determined that the best
location for a new store would be a vacant parcel of land near the
interchange of Highway 81 and County Road BB, several miles outside of the
town of Old Orleans. It chose that location because its store would be visible

48

Petitioner Brief 2, at 1.
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from Highway 81, which is the main route in to the Lost River Recreation
Area. The fact that the land was relatively flat and undeveloped would also
reduce the cost of improving the land so as to support a standard BiggBox
retail outlet.
BiggBox thereafter obtained an option to purchase the land, subject to
the approval of the Wetmarsh Township Supervisors to rezone the land from
agricultural to commercial. However, soon after BiggBox filed its rezoning
application, representatives of the Old Orleans Area Industrial Development
Agency contacted BiggBox, seeking to persuade BiggBox to abandon the
Wetmarsh Township location and locate, instead, in a vacant sawmill within
the Borough of Old Orleans. It offered various tax and financing incentives in
order to encourage BiggBox to locate in the borough. BiggBox considered the
Agency’s proposal but ultimately rejected it, because it would have increased
the cost of development of the store and because the location in the Borough
of Old Orleans was not as visible nor as easily accessible from major
thoroughfares.49
The story briefs thus provided a great deal more context about how the controversy
arose (both clients’ “struggles”), and what both clients hoped to achieve (their “goals”). The
character of each client was thus developed, in an effort to build sympathy in the reader’s
mind toward each client. The conflict became more vivid; the goal of each client was more
visible.
Another central element of a story is the “theme.”50 While most appellate brief
writing texts recommend choosing a clear theme, in practice much of this advice translates
to “present a clear legal theory.” For example, Justice Scalia and Professor Garner write
that an appellate brief “must form a coherent whole.” They recommend that the brief be
designed “to bring out your theory of the case and your principal themes,”51 but they also

49

Petitioner Brief 2, at. 1-2.

50

See Chestek, supra n. 17, at 146-47.

51

Scalia & Garner, supra n. 13, at 59.

-18-

recommend strongly that the advocate “think syllogistically.”52
Scalia & Garner’s formulation suggests that the “theory of the case” and the
“theme” are synonyms, or at least closely related. However, when one analyzes persuasion
according to the double-helix “DNA model,” “theory of the case” and “theme” become
distinct. The “theory of the case” equates to the “legal theory:” the logical, law-based reason
why a particular result is required (i.e. the logos strand). In a story strand of reasoning,
however, the emotional core (or pathos-based) reason why a court should want to rule in
your client’s favor can be described as the “theme” of your case. A good brief, which fully
develops both the logical and the story strands of reasoning, should therefore include both
a coherent, logical “theory of the case” and an emotionally satisfying “theme.”
Consider how this works in the test briefs. The store’s “theory of the case” was that
the doctrine of stare decisis compelled the lower courts to adhere to the precedents that
establish the legal personhood of corporations, while the county’s legal theory was that
precedents can be overruled when specified standards suggest the continued social utility
of a legal rule is questionable. These are both appeals to the logical brain (although the
“soft” standards for when changed circumstances are sufficient to allow precedent to be
overruled may require some story reasoning).
Themes, however, work at a different level; they appeal to the emotional brain. The
theme of a story brief should evoke an emotional response from the reader. The theme
should explain the motivations of the characters, and give the reader a reason to respect

52

Id. at 41. Scalia & Garner do emphasize the importance of “knowing your case,” and advise the
brief writer not to “underestimate the importance of the facts.” Id. at 8-9. However, they clarify
that the facts are important not for their own sake, but only as fodder for applying legal
reasoning: “To be sure, you will be arguing to the court about the law, but what law
applies—what cases are in point, and what cases can be distinguished—depends ultimately on
the facts of your case.” Id.
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and “root for” those characters.53 Thus, in addition to the legal theories (the propriety, or
not, of adhering to precedent in this case), I set about to include a strong theme in both of
the story briefs.54
In thinking about the theme for the story briefs, I used the concept of “deep frames”
described by cognitive scientist George Lakoff. Lakoff describes “deep frames” as “moral
and political principles that are so deep they are part of your very identity. . . . Deep
frames are the ones that structure how you view the world.”55 Deep frames can be stated in
just a few words, and should evoke a predictable response from the listener. For example,
Lakoff describes the word “freedom” as a deep frame. At the heart of every deep frame is
what he calls an “uncontested idea;” in this case the idea is that “freedom” is good and is
something all people long for.56 Deep frames work at an almost unconscious level,57 and

53

Prof. Ruth Anne Robbins proposes that brief writers should attempt to cast their clients, the
protagonists in the stories that a lawyer needs to tell, as heroes, and she suggests various
archetypal roles that the clients could fulfill. Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers
and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal
Hero’s Journey, 29 Seattle L. Rev. 767 (2006).

54

Since I view “theme” as the heart of story reasoning, the logos briefs did not include a strong
theme. This was one of the ways in which I sought to isolate the variable of story in the two
briefs participants were asked to evaluate.

55

George Lakoff, Whose Freedom? The Battle over America’s Most Important Idea (Farrar, Straus
and Giroux 2006), at 12.

56

Id. at 14.
Storyteller Annette Simmons makes the same point when she suggests that storytellers “tap into
the listener’s momentum” by tapping “into one of the core human needs that we all share . . ..”
Simmons, supra n. 33, at 110.

57

Prof. Linda Berger points out that “[b]ecause . . . stories shape our recognition of the problem,
they control the directions we tend to follow in solving it. So, for instance, when a father is
described as a ‘deadbeat dad,’ the Trouble driving the plot can be overcome by requiring him to
pay his debt and meet his financial obligations, rather than by requiring him to take
responsibility for parenting his children . . .”. Berger, supra n. 19, at 282. In her example, the
term “deadbeat dad” is a “deep frame” through which the reader is led to a desired emotional
response.
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often can trump facts.58
In choosing themes for the two story briefs, I sought to identify deep frames that
would connect with fundamental and nearly-universal values that appellate judges were
likely to hold. For the brief on behalf of the hardware store, therefore, I chose the deep
frame of the free market: the free enterprise system works best when market actors are
free to pursue their economic best interests with the minimum of government interference.
For the brief on behalf of the county, the deep frame was Americana: small towns in
America should be free to choose for themselves what their community looks like and how
it functions. (Both frames, of course, rely on the “uncontested core” that freedom is good.)
In practice, I suspect that most attorneys would write briefs that are something
more than pure information-based narratives and which include some elements of story.
But to accurately measure the persuasive effect of the story line, I had to isolate the
variable of story-based reasoning as much as possible. Both the logos briefs and the story
briefs were therefore somewhat exaggerated attempts to adhere to the two definitions
described above.59 For example, all four briefs used the same neutral Statement of the

58

“Suppose a fact is inconsistent with the frames and metaphors in your brain that define common
sense. Then the frame or metaphor will stay, and the fact will be ignored. For facts to make sense
they must fit existing frames and metaphors in the brain.” Lakoff, supra n. 55, at 13. As just one
example, nearly three years after former President Bush admitted that there was no link
between Saddam Hussein and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, three independent
polls showed that between 31 and 46 of all respondents still believed there was such a link.
Angus Reid Forum, Some Americans Still Link Hussein to 9/11 (published on September 9,
2006), http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/13081 (Last visited on August 16, 2009). This
perception is likely because the link fit people’s “deep frame” that Hussein was involved, a frame
created during the run-up to the Iraq war by President Bush and others who frequently
mentioned 9/11 and Hussein in close proximity to each other.

59

I should add here that, within the constraints of attempting to cleanly separate “logos” from
“story”, I attempted to write the best briefs I could on each side of the case.
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Issue.60 Also, in an effort to make sure that the “logos strand” in each brief was functionally
the same as the corresponding story brief (thereby isolating the “story argument” as the
only variable), every case cited in the story brief was also discussed in the logos brief on
that side of the case.61 Each logos/story pair of briefs made the same basic legal arguments,
although in some cases the arguments were rearranged or stated differently in the story
briefs in order to fit the storyline. For example, both briefs for the hardware store began by
citing numerous cases which held that corporations were “persons” entitled to the free
speech protections of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, then argued
that no reason existed to overturn that precedent. Both briefs concluded with an argument
that a “self determination clause” of the West Dakota constitution did not give humans
greater rights than corporations; however, the story brief provided additional context for
this argument by describing the history surrounding the adoption of that provision. The
brief argued that since the self-determination clause was adopted long after several of the
previously cited cases which held that corporations were protected “persons,” the word
“people” in the clause should be construed to include corporations.62
To minimize the reading that participants would have to complete (in an effort to
maximize participation in the study), no appendix or record was included; thus, none of the

60

All four briefs used this statement of the issue:
The question certified by this Court is as follows: “Whether Proposition 3, adopted by the
voters of Independence County, unconstitutionally deprives corporations of protectable
rights under either the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, §
6 of the West Dakota Constitution.”
See briefs reproduced at Appendix A, infra.

61

Both of the logos briefs cited a few more cases than the corresponding story briefs, but all of the
major cases relied upon in the logos briefs were also discussed in the story briefs.

62

See Petitioner Brief 2, infra at pp. 8-9.
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four briefs included citations to the record.
C.

The test subjects

Next, I had to recruit participants to my study.
While the principal purpose for this study was to measure the persuasive effect of
stories on appellate judges, I was also interested to see if different groups would react in
different ways to these briefs. Thus, I recruited not only appellate judges, but appellate law
clerks, appellate court staff attorneys, practicing appellate lawyers, and legal writing
professors to participate in the study.63 Initially, 175 participants signed up for the study.
My research assistant then randomly assigned each participant to review a pair of briefs
for the Petitioner or the Respondent.64
Ultimately, 95 participants read the briefs and completed the online survey tool:

63

Judicial participants throughout the country were invited to participate in the survey through an
e-mail sent by the Hon. Frank Sullivan of the Indiana Supreme Court, who was serving as
chairman of the American Bar Association’s Appellate Judge’s Conference at the time of the
study. Appellate practitioners were invited to participate in the study through a similar e-mail
sent to members of the ABA’s Appellate Practice Committee. Law professors were invited to
participate through e-mails sent to national listservs for legal writing professors and clinical law
professors, as well as a more general listserv for all law professors. (The only law professors who
participated, however, were legal writing professors and a few professors who teach both legal
writing and live client clinics.) None of the e-mails disclosed the test variable; the announcement
seeking participants for this study said:
The 2008 Persuasion Study will ask volunteer appellate judges, appellate law clerks,
appellate practitioners and legal writing professors to review two short, one-issue briefs,
both arguing the same side of a fictional case in a fictional jurisdiction. The two briefs
will be carefully written to make the best possible argument available, but using
different persuasive approaches to the case. Participants will then be asked to select
which of the two briefs they found more persuasive.
2008 Persuasion Study announcement [copy on file with the author].

64

Because we had to send the test materials out to each participant, my research assistant handled
all of these mailings. She was instructed not to disclose to me, and has not disclosed to me, the
identity of any participant. A copy of the instructions she sent to participants and the survey
questions can be found at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1421494.
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Table 1
Survey Participants
Category

Number participating

Appellate judges

13

Appellate law clerks

12

Appellate court staff attorneys

8

Appellate practitioners

37

Law professors

25

TOTAL

95

The online survey gathered some basic demographic information about the
participants (including gender, the job held by the respondent, years of experience in that
job, and geographic region). Participants were assigned a random participant number and
filled out the online survey using only that number, in order to preserve anonymity of
responses.65
D.

The survey questions

The heart of the online survey was a series of simple questions. First, respondents
were asked, “Which of the two briefs you read was more persuasive for the position being
advocated?”66 Participants were then asked to score, on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “not
very persuasive” and 5 being “very persuasive”), the overall brief, the recitation of the facts,

65

The study was “double blind,” in that not only were the names of the participants hidden from
me, I did not identify myself to participants as the principal investigator. Participants were
recruited through a SurveyMonkey website which identified me only as a “professor at a major
Midwestern university.”

66

Respondents in all categories (judges, clerks, practitioners and professors) were asked the same
question. The “writers” (professors and practitioners) were not asked to predict which brief they
thought the “readers” (judges and clerks) might prefer.
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and the argument section.67
All participants were sent, by e-mail, the logos and the story briefs on a randomlyassigned side of the case. At first, this choice may seem odd, since judges are not typically
asked to review two briefs on the same side of a single case. Judges are trained to review
briefs from opposing parties and render a judgment based on the quality of the legal
arguments made. However, since I had chosen a “hard case” as the subject of this study, I
feared that asking the participants to judge briefs on opposite sides of the case would
inevitably pollute the data by injecting the merits of the case into the scoring process.
Because I was attempting to isolate the story variable, I did not want the participants to
base their scoring in any way on which side of the case had the better argument on the law.
The survey went live at the end of January 2009 with the electronic delivery of the
test briefs and instructions to all 175 participants. Data collection continued through
March.
III.

Survey results
In some respects, the data revealed what I expected, but there were a few surprises

as well. I was not surprised to learn that most readers, including judges, tended to prefer
the story briefs; however, I was surprised to learn that this preference appeared to become
stronger the longer a particular respondent had held his or her job.
A.

Overall results

My first hypothesis was that the story brief would prove to be more persuasive than
the pure logos brief. The overall data suggest that hypothesis is correct:

67

A copy of the the survey questions can be found at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1421494.
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Table 2
All participants
Brief

More persuasive (n)

%

Logos brief

29

30.5%

Story brief

61

64.2%

Neither

5

5.3%

TOTAL

95

100%

My second hypothesis was that the story brief would have a greater impact on the
Respondent side of the case, since the law favored Petitioner. Table 3 breaks down the
results between Petitioner and Respondent briefs.
Table 3
Petitioner vs. Respondent
Brief

More persuasive (n)

%

Logos brief

16

33.3%

Story brief

30

62.5%

Neither

2

4.2%

48

100%

Logos brief

13

27.7%

Story brief

31

66.0%

Neither

3

6.4%

47

100%

Respondent briefs

TOTAL
Petitioner briefs

TOTAL

Given the sample size, these results likely fall within the margin of error for this
study. In short, my second test hypothesis appears to have been disproven; there was no
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significant difference between the Respondent briefs and the Petitioner briefs. Story seems
to work in all cases, not just hard ones.
B.

Differences by job function

One of the main purposes of this study was to determine, if possible, whether
stories persuaded the primary audience for briefs: appellate judges.
Unfortunately, while 23 appellate judges initially registered for the study, only 13
ultimately read the briefs and completed the study. Thus, in an effort to get a larger
sample, I initially combined the categories of appellate judges, appellate court staff
attorneys, and appellate law clerks into a category of “readers of briefs.” I then compared
those results with “writers of briefs” (the appellate practitioners), and the law professor
category. These results are displayed in Table 4.
Table 4
Responses by Participant Group
Brief

“Readers”

“Writers”

Law Profs.

Logos

12

36.4%

8

21.6%

9

36.0%

Story

19

57.6%

27

73.0%

15

60.0%

Neither

2

6.1%

2

5.4%

1

4.0%

Total

33

37

25

In this grouping, it appeared that the law professors reacted to story in almost
exactly the same way that the readers group did. Upon reflection, however, I wondered if
the readers group was as homogeneous as I thought. I therefore did another chart,
breaking the readers group down into its constituent parts. The results of that analysis are
shown in Table 5.
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Table 5
Responses by Participant Type
Brief

Appl. Judge

Law Clerks

Staff Attys.

Practitioners

Law
Profs.

Logos

4

30.8%

6

50.0%

2

25.0%

8

21.6%

9

36.0%

Story

7

53.8%

6

50.0%

6

75.0%

27

73.0%

15

60.0%

Neither

2

15.4%

0

0.0%

0

0.0%

2

5.4%

1

4.0%

Total

13

12

8

37

25

The most interesting difference revealed in Table 5 is the wide discrepancy between
law clerks and other “readers” as to how persuasive the logos brief was to them. I will
explore this finding in more detail in part V-B, below.68
C.

Gender differences

I was also curious to see if there was any gender-based difference in the responses.
Stereotypically, women are perceived to be more emotional; would they respond to the
story brief in greater numbers than the male respondents? It appears that gender made
absolutely no difference; men and women reacted to the briefs in virtually identical ways.
Table 6 analyzes all respondents by gender.

68

See infra pp. 40-43.
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Table 6
Gender differences
Brief

More persuasive (n)

%

Male respondents (n = 56)
Logos brief

17

30.4%

Story brief

36

64.3%

Neither

3

5.4%

Logos brief

12

30.8%

Story brief

25

64.1%

Neither

2

5.2%

Female respondents (n = 39)

D.

Job longevity

One of the demographic questions asked respondents how long they had held their
current job. I was curious to see if respondents got more jaded over time, favoring pure
logic over the “softer” story briefs. Surprisingly, I found the opposite to be true. It appears
that the longer one works in a particular job, the more the story of the case is persuasive.
Table 7 breaks down the responses by the number of years each respondent had held his or
her current job.

-29-

Table 7
Responses by Experience in Job
Brief

0-4 yrs.

5-9 yrs.

10-14
yrs.

15-19
yrs.

20-24 yrs.

25+ yrs.

Logos

11

45.8%

5

33.3%

4

26.7%

1

10.0%

6

35.3%

2

14.3%

Story

13

54.2%

9

60.0%

9

60.0%

9

90.0%

10

58.8%

11

78.6%

Neither

0

0.0%

1

6.7%

2

13.3%

0

0.0%

1

5.9%

1

7.1%

TOTAL

24

15

15

10

17

14

Grouping the two ends of the spectrum together reveals an interesting pattern:
Table 8
Responses by Experience Groups
Brief

More persuasive (n)

%

0-9 years’ experience (n = 39)
Logos brief

16

41.0%

Story brief

22

56.4%

Neither

1

2.6%

Logos brief

9

22.0%

Story brief

30

73.2%

Neither

2

4.9%

15+ years’ experience (n = 41)

I will also explore this finding in greater detail in part V-B, below.
IV.

How reliable is the data?
Before we can evaluate the data, several questions need to be addressed. First, does

the survey tool really measure what it claims to measure? Second, was the test itself free
from bias? Third, was the sample collected representative of the universe the test sought to
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study?
A.

Does the survey tool accurately measure the intended variable?

Do the test briefs in this study really measure the persuasive impact of story
reasoning? Given the complexity of the effect sought to be measured (what is “persuasive”),
it is probably impossible for the briefs, which were themselves complex documents, to
cleanly separate “story” from “logic.” But many of the comments left by the survey
participants in the final, open-ended “comment” field suggest that the participants were in
fact reacting to that variable (or, at least, were reacting to the things I intentionally did to
try to isolate those two strands).
The most common theme throughout the responses was that the background
information, or context, either distracted the reader or (more often) helped the reader gain
perspective on the legal question presented to the court. (The story of the case, of course, is
primarily told through those background details; stated otherwise, the context tells the
story.) Here is a sampling of some of those comments:
From participants favoring the story brief
•

[The story brief] worked much better because it provided context to the legal
arguments.

•

The [story] brief was more persuasive because it provided a far better factual
context within which to consider the legal arguments.

•

[The logos brief] was reasoned well, but it included no persuasive principles, like
ethos and pathos. [The story brief] made the reader aware of the Petitioner’s
business and, despite being a large corporation, personified it and made the reader
sympathize with it.
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•

The author of [the story brief] provided a much stronger statement of facts by
setting the dispute in a broader context and portraying opponents as not driven by
any principle. The statement of facts in [the logos brief], although accurate, seemed
to forgo the opportunity to define the field on which the parties would battle and, by
doing so, essentially allowed the opposing party to do the defining.

•

The recitation of facts in [the story brief] helped tremendously in placing
petitioner’s argument in context.

•

[The logos brief] did not personalize the situation for the corporation; [the story
brief] did that well. By the end of the facts section, I was pre-disposed to favor the
corporation. ... [The logos brief] did not seem to have any sense of the big picture.
[The story brief] took a much more expansive view and, thus, was more eloquent in
every section.

•

[The story brief] told a better story, framing the issue in a more colorful way, thus
providing better context for the dispute. It gave more detailed information and
background, which gave me the context I needed.

•

I thought the two briefs were interesting representatives of opposite ends of a
spectrum. [The logos brief] lacked any sort of context, while [the story brief] had too
much. A happy medium would have been better.

•

[The logos brief] did not put the issues in context. [The story brief] provided a story
that supported the legal arguments.

From participants favoring the logos brief
•

[The story brief] included irrelevant facts in the facts section, which hurts its
credibility. Its introduction section was too argumentative and not adequately
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focused on the issue at hand.
•

[The logos brief] was cut-to-the-chase and no-nonsense with the argument stated
clearly. [The story brief] used more flowery language. . . .

•

I found the length and level of detail of the fact section in [the story brief] to be
annoying because it seemed that the case should be decided on the law, not the
facts. Indeed, the argument section in [the story brief] didn’t appear to use a lot of
the facts provided, confirming that there [sic] inclusion was unnecessary.

•

The goal of appellate courts is to consider and to decide specific questions of law.
[The story brief] speaks in very expansive terms of the general issues in this case,
including environmental issues, and in so doing distracts from the specific issue of
law that is to be argued.

•

The almost-wholly irrelevant statement of facts, and consistent-irrelevant rhetoric
of [the story brief] was off-putting. It was realistically representative of briefs that
obscure questions of law under emotional grandstanding.[The logos brief] was
concise and to the point. [The story brief] seemed to bury the material facts and
legal argument in extraneous background facts, which I found ineffective and
distracting.
These comments seem to confirm that many readers were in fact reacting to the

story elements I intentionally included in the story briefs.
B.

Were the test briefs unintentionally biased in favor of story?

This question is complex and perhaps not susceptible of a definitive answer. As I
noted above, in writing the test briefs I tried to create a fair test; that is, I attempted to
write the best briefs I could by sticking faithfully to the definitions of “story” and
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“information-based narrative” described above.69
One way of determining whether there was a built-in, unintentional bias in the test
would be to look at the numerical scores assigned to the briefs by the participants. If the
logos briefs were of significantly lower quality, then those numerical scores would likely be
significantly lower than the scores of the story briefs.
Participants were asked to score each brief on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “not
very persuasive” and 5 being “very persuasive.” Table 9 shows the average overall scores
for each pair of briefs, as well as a combined total.
Table 9
Average Overall Brief Scores
Brief

Petitioner

Respondent

Both

Logos

3.44

2.65

3.05

Story

4.10

3.34

3.73

Diff.

0.66

0.69

0.68

As this table demonstrates, the average difference in score between the logos and
story briefs was less than a single point. The combined score for all logos briefs was 3.05, or
“neutral” on the five-point scale; had the survey participants thought the briefs to be badly
written or useless, one would have expected an average score below 3 for the logos briefs.70
Another way of looking at this would be to measure the relative strength of the

69

See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.

70

The fact that the Respondent briefs were scored significantly lower than the Petitioner pair likely
reflects the fact that the Respondent had the “hard case” to make; that is to say, participants felt
the briefs attempting to enforce stare decisis were more persuasive than the briefs seeking to
overturn long-standing precedent. This seems to bear out my fear, discussed at p. 25, supra, that
asking participants to evaluate matched pairs of petitioner and respondent briefs would have
injected the merits of the case as an uncontrolled variable in the reader’s evaluations.
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reactions to the briefs by those who preferred the logos brief compared with those who
preferred the story brief. Table 10 compares these reactions:
Table 10
Average Brief Scores by Preference
Brief

Preferred Logos

Preferred Story

Logos

4.04

2.62

Story

2.87

4.18

Diff.

1.17

1.56

It appears that a participant’s strength of preference was comparable regardless of
whether one preferred the logos or the story brief, although those who preferred the story
brief seemed to have a slightly stronger preference than those who preferred logos. But
most significantly, the participants who indicated a preference for one of the briefs rated
their favored brief, on average, just above 4, and the difference between those preferences
(4.04 compared to 4.18) was small. If there had been an unintentional bias built in to the
test, one might have expected the quality ranking of the logos briefs to be significantly
lower than that of the story briefs.
It is also instructive to examine individual responses to each pair of briefs. I
examined each survey response and calculated the absolute value of the difference in
scores between the two briefs the respondent read. By doing so, I sought to determine the
strength of each individual respondent’s reaction to the briefs. Because the scoring scale
was a range from 1 to 5, the highest possible differential (4) would suggest that the
participant had a very strong preference for one brief over the other, while the lowest
possible differential (0) would indicate that the participant had no preference between the
two briefs. The median absolute value of the differential between the two briefs proved to
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be 1, regardless of whether the respondent was reviewing the Petitioner or Respondent
pair. This analysis also indicates that most respondents felt the two briefs were fairly even,
and their preferences for one or the other were not strong.71
While none of this proves that the test instrument was unbiased, the consistency of
the differences between the Petitioner and Respondent briefs, as well as the relatively
weak preferences expressed for one brief over the other, gives me some confidence that the
briefs did accomplish the goal of presenting the best briefs possible within the design
parameters.
C.

Was the respondent sample representative?

Because the study relied on self-selected volunteers, another possible objection
might be that the pool of respondents was unrepresentative. If the pools was
unrepresentative, the question then arises whether the skew in the sample introduced
some sort of bias in the results.
It is impossible to determine whether a sample is representative of the entire
universe of possible test subjects without knowing the demographic makeup of that
universe. And, in this case, it is difficult to know much about that universe. Because the
main focus of the study was how appellate judges reacted to the two different briefs, I
asked my research assistant to visit the websites of all of the appellate courts in all 50
states and for all federal appeals courts. She was able to gather the names, locations, and
(in most cases) the genders of the “universe” comprised of all appellate court judges or
justices in the United States. She counted 1,480 appellate judges in all state and federal

71

Only one respondent out of 95 rated one brief as a “1” and the other as a “5” (creating the
maximum differential of 4). Fifty-four of the 95 respondents rated the difference between the two
briefs as either zero or 1.
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appellate courts as of June 2008. Her findings are reported in Table 11:
Table 11
Demographic makeup of U.S. appellate courts72
Criterion

n Judges

% of Total

Male

985

66.6%

Female

495

33.4%

1480

100%

Region 1 (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virgin Islands

248

16.8%

Region 2 (Alabama, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia)

335

22.6%

Region 3 (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio,
South Dakota, Wisconsin)

338

22.8%

Region 4 (Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah)

295

19.9%

Region 5 (Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Northern Mariana Islands,
Oregon, Washington, Wyoming)

264

17.8%

1480

100%

Gender

TOTAL
Regional Distribution

TOTAL

This chart shows the number of judges in each category, as well as the percentage
that number represents of the whole of each category. If the sample of judges was perfectly
representative of this universe, one would expect the sample to reflect nearly the same
percentages.
72

The regions described below were based upon combinations of the geographic coverage of the
various circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals.
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It appears that the sample actually gathered is not representative of the whole
universe, at least on the criteria of gender and region. Of the 13 judges who responded,
only 2, or 15.4%, were female (compared to a total universe of 33.4% female). However,
because the overall data strongly suggests that gender does not matter,73 it is possible that
this variance did not produce any significant bias in the results.74
The regional breakdown of the respondents likewise was unrepresentative of the
total universe. Seven of the 13 judicial respondents were from Region 3, representing
53.8% of all respondents (compared to a total universe of 22.8% from that region). That
anomaly is likely related to the fact that the principal means of recruiting judicial
participants was an e-mail to the American Bar Association’s e-mail list for appellate
judges, sent by the chair of the ABA’s Appellate Judge’s Conference, Justice Frank Sullivan
of the Indiana Supreme Court. (Indiana is in Region 3.)
The effect, if any, of this overrepresentation of Region 3 is hard to determine. The
seven responding judges from that region split evenly between the two briefs: three favored
the logos brief, three favored the story brief and one said they were equal. The six judges
from the other regions broke heavily for the story brief: one favored the logos brief, four
favored the story brief and one said they were equal. Given the small sample size, it is
probably impossible to tell whether the Region 3 judges or the other judges are more
representative of the entire universe of judges. It is safe to say, however, that any bias that

73

See Table 6 and accompanying text, supra.

74

Bias would result if it could be shown that the two female judges who responded to the survey
were unrepresentative of the larger population of females who responded to the survey. The two
female judges disagreed as to whether Brief 1 or Brief 2 was more persuasive. If one eliminates
those two responses from the universe of 95 responses, the percentage hardly changes. Overall,
survey participants favored the story brief by a margin of 64.2% to 30.5%; excluding the two
female judges changes that ratio only to 64.5% to 30.1%.
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results from the overinclusion of Region 3 judges in the sample appears to be in favor of the
logos brief. (Or, stated conversely, it is possible that judges generally prefer the story brief
more strongly than this sample would suggest.)
The fact that the other groups in the study also favored the story brief gives me
some comfort that the results from the judges are accurate. As noted in Table 5, above, 73%
of the 37 appellate lawyers who participated in the study found the story brief more
persuasive.75 Because presumably most appellate judges have had previous job experience
as appellate attorneys, the finding that appellate judges also prefer the story briefs is not
surprising.
As for the other groups of participants, there is no readily ascertainable data as to
how many lawyers consider themselves to be appellate lawyers, nor what their gender and
regional makeup would be; the same is true for the other categories. It is thus impossible to
determine whether those samples are representative of those groups.
V.

Some preliminary conclusions
So what do the data reveal?
Given the relatively small sample size, especially in some groups, it is hard to draw

many general conclusions with confidence. However, the data do suggest some preliminary
conclusions; hopefully future studies will help to verify (or not) the following findings.
A.

Overall results

Taking all responses together, the story briefs were found to be more persuasive.
While the appellate judges in the sample tended to prefer the story briefs, this result was
more pronounced among appellate practitioners. This response is not surprising; appellate
75

See Table 5, supra. Note also that 75% of the appellate court staff attorneys also rated the story
brief as more persuasive.
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practitioners are the group that knows the story of their clients most intimately, and
therefore are the people most likely to understand (and respond to) the power of story. The
data also suggest, however, that advocates should be cautious in this endeavor; many of
the comments from respondents (especially those from law clerks and judges) suggested
that overly long briefs and “irrelevant details” were distracting and ultimately
counterproductive.76
Gender appears not to matter at all, but experience seems to. The longer a
respondent has been in his or her current job, the more it appears that the story brief was
persuasive.
B.

Experience-based differences

Perhaps the most surprising finding of this study was that respondents with less job
experience (especially including law clerks) tended to rate the logos brief more highly than
more experienced participants did. It is interesting to consider why experience matters.
Part of the phenomenon might be explained by the fact that the group of
respondents with less than five years’ experience in their jobs was the group that found the
logos brief the most persuasive (more than 45% of that group preferred the logos brief). A
large percentage of the respondents with less than five years’ experience in their jobs were
law clerks, who as a group preferred the logos and story briefs equally. (The law clerks
were the only group that did not express an overall preference for the story brief.)
There are probably many possible explanations for why law clerks scored the logos

76

One appellate judge commented that the story brief “spent too much time on irrelavant [sic]
background.” More interestingly, five of the six law clerks who judged the logos brief as more
persuasive wrote comments as to why they preferred that brief; four of those five said the logos
brief was more concise and/or that the story brief contained too many irrelevant details. See also
sampling of comments who favored the logos brief at pp. 32 to 33, supra.
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briefs higher than any other group. Two that come to mind are these: First, law schools
tend to teach that “thinking like a lawyer” means breaking a fact pattern into small,
abstract pieces, applying logical rules to those fragments, and then reasoning your way to a
conclusion through syllogisms, analogies, or other logical processes.77 Very few courses in a
typical law school curriculum focus on the more human, emotional content of problem
solving. Law students, in short, are primarily trained in logos,78 and not as much in story.
Another plausible explanation may be that law clerks are reading the briefs with a
different purpose in mind. Law clerks are not the readers who must be persuaded; the
judges are. Law clerks may tend to view their job as helping their judge find the relevant
rules of law; thus briefs that focus more on the law (rather than the story) are more useful

77

The Carnegie Foundation report on legal education describes the nearly-ubiquitous case method
of instruction as the “signature pedagogy” of law schools. The “deep structure” of that pedagogy,
the authors conclude, “is that ‘thinking like a lawyer’ is about processes of analytic reasoning.”
Sullivan, supra n. 24, at [Kindle location 377]. The authors also report that one of the students
they interviewed identified “formally structured arguments” as the key to “thinking like a
lawyer.” Id. at [Kindle location 618].

78

Judge Richard Posner has talked about the “excessively rhetorical emphasis of legal education.”
Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 Boston L. Rev. 1049, 1049 (2006);
see also Posner, How Judges Think, at 219 (“The academic emphasis on the formal grounds of a
decision conveys to law students and the bar the impression that every judge is a thoroughgoing
legalist who can therefore be ‘reached’ only by ceaseless iteration of legalist slogans such as ‘plain
meaning’ and by barrages of case citations.”); Brian J. Foley, Applied Legal Storytelling, Politics,
and Factual Realism, 14 J. Leg. Writing 17, 41 (2008) (“casebook classes and appellate judges
focus on logos, whereas clinics—and actual law practice—focus on all three aspects of persuasion
[logos, pathos and ethos].”); Stacy Caplow, Putting the “I” in Wr*t*ing: Drafting and A/Effective
Personal Statement to Tell a Winning Refugee Story, 14 J. Leg. Writing 249, 259 (“Logos is the
process of using logic and reason to persuade. It is the most familiar approach for lawyers whose
training prepares them to routinely argue about rules and policies and to draw inferences by
analogy”); Marjorie L. Silver, Emotional Intelligence and Legal Education, 5 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y
& L. 1173, 1192-93 (1999) (arguing that overemphasis of the Socratic method “alienates students
from the people-centered reality of everyday law practice,” and that law schools should do more
to develop the emotional intelligences of their students).
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for that purpose.79
If the latter explanation is correct, one might expect that the nine law clerks in the
group of 24 who fell into the “less than five years’ experience” category might have favored
the logos brief at a higher rate than the 15 non-law clerks in that group. However, that
proved not to be the case. The nine law clerks in that group favored the story brief by a
five-to-four margin (a statistical tie), while the fifteen non-law clerks favored the story
brief by an eight-to-seven margin (likewise a statistical tie).80
Comparing the median job experience for each group with the level of support for
the logos brief also reveals an interesting pattern. Table 12 lists all five groups, in
ascending order of the median experience81 in the job represented in the sample for that
group. The third column shows the level of support each group reported for the logos brief.
It reveals a nearly perfect inversion: the more job experience one has, the less likely one

79

When I presented a preliminary version of this article at a faculty colloquium, two of the
professors in the audience were former appellate court clerks. They suggested that the clerks
who responded to the survey may have differing reactions to the briefs depending upon their
relationship with their judge. One of the professors said that his judge typically read the briefs
and made his initial judgment, and then assigned the clerk to assist in writing the judge’s
opinion. The other professor said her judge liked to get the clerks involved with the case before
rendering his decision, so that he could talk out alternatives while reaching his decision. In the
former case, the brief became merely a repository of legal rules, so the clerk would likely view the
brief more as a reference to find the law. In the latter case, the brief’s persuasive content
(including the story) might be more important to the clerk reading the brief.

80

There were also 3 “appellate court staff attorneys” in the 0-4 years’ experience group. If one
groups those responses with the law clerks, the law clerk/appellate court staff attorneys split 6-6
between the logos and the story briefs, while the rest of that group (one judge, three practitioners
and eight professors) favored the story brief by a 7-5 margin, still a statistical tie.

81

The survey tool asked participants to place themselves in a five-year range for length of tenure in
their current job, rather than the precise number of years the participant held the job. Thus, the
second column of Table 12 shows the median range of experience reported by the participants,
rather than the median years of experience.
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was to find the logos brief more persuasive.82
Table 12
Comparison of Median Experience to Preference for Logos Brief
Group

Median exp.

% Favoring Logos

Law clerks

0-4 years

50%

Law professors

5-9 years

33.3%

Court staff attorneys

10-14 years

25%

Appellate judges

15-19 years

30.8%

Appellate practitioners

20-24 years

21.6%

All of this suggests that lawyers who have most recently graduated from law school
are likely to be more persuaded by logical argumentation, since they think that’s what
“thinking like a lawyer” means.83 As lawyers gain experience, however, the story becomes
more persuasive. It is not clear, however, why this is true. Perhaps it is because “the law”
becomes familiar and the stories become the “new” information that is interesting and
engages the attention of the reader. Or perhaps it is related to the fact that emotional
reasoning (the “story strand” of our DNA molecule) evolved in the human brain long before
logical reasoning.84 Perhaps as we mature, we learn to trust our emotional reasoning
processes more.
This experienced-based preference for story has implications for law school

82

The appellate court staff attorneys and the appellate judges rank third and fourth, respectively,
in terms of median experience in their jobs, and fourth and third, respectively, in their level of
support for the logos brief. The other three groups fit the pattern perfectly.

83

Note that the law professor group gave the logos brief the second highest ranking among all five
groups; see Table 12, supra.

84

Jonah Lehrer, How We Decide (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2009) pp. 23-24.
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pedagogy, which tends to focus to a high degree on logical reasoning almost to the exclusion
of emotional reasoning. The traditional law school curriculum has recently come under
close scrutiny due to two separate reports: the Carnegie Foundation’s 2007 report
Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law,85 and the Clinical Legal
Education Association’s report that same year, Best Practices for Legal Education.86 Both of
these studies, as well as other commentators,87 suggest that law schools should re-evaluate
the traditional focus on legal theory and increase training in legal skills. A full
examination of this question is beyond the scope of this article, although I will observe that
changes are starting to happen.88
C.

Where do we go from here?

The lesson of my study seems to be that judges are not persuaded by logic alone; the
stories behind the legal dispute in my test briefs captured their attention and helped
persuade them, regardless of which side of the case they were randomly assigned to. The
data also suggest that as lawyers gain work experience (or, alternatively, as they gain
distance from their law school training), the power of stories only grows. These findings

85

Carnegie Foundation, supra, n. 24.

86

Roy Stuckey, et al., Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and a Road Map (Clinical Legal
Education Association 2007).

87

See, e.g. Kathryn Stanchi, Step Away from the Case Book: A Call for Balance and Integration in
Law School Pedagogy, 43 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 611 (2008); David I. C. Thomson, Law School
2.0: Legal Education for a Digital Age (Lexis Nexis 2009), at 22 (“The students of the future will
need to know not just how to ‘think like a lawyer’ — the traditional pedagogical goal — but how
to ‘act and be a lawyer.’”)

88

See generally Thomson, id. The emergence of the Applied Legal Storytelling conferences,
described in note 90, infra, and the scholarship that movement has spawned, is another example
of how studies of real-world lawyering are beginning to inform classroom teaching around the
country. See Ruth Anne Robbins, An Introduction to Applied Storytelling and to This
Symposium, 14 J. Leg. Writing 3 (2008); Foley, supra n. 78.

-44-

have implications not only for how practitioners should write their briefs, but also for how
law professors should think about, and teach, persuasion.
I have not attempted to address here the question of how stories work. It seems
likely that the reason involves cognitive science and neurobiology, and the way that a
human’s “emotional brain” informs the “logical brain” in the decision-making process.89
However, I leave a fuller exploration of that subject to others.90
Likewise, I have not attempted to address the normative question of whether stories
should work. As the reference to the role of empathy in judicial decisionmaking at the
beginning of this article suggests, this is a matter of some controversy: some judges (and
perhaps politicians?) seem to believe that the law is all about logic and rules, and would
therefore deny any role for the “story” of a case (i.e. the human context and the goals of the
litigants) in rendering a decision. These critics may worry that accepting the fact that
stories persuade judges is a significant step down the road toward the rule of men rather

89

See generally Damasio, supra n. 5.

90

The examination of the role of stories in legal reasoning has recently gained significant scholarly
attention. Two conferences devoted to the emerging field of Applied Legal Storytelling have
recently been held: the first at the City University of London in July, 2007 (see generally volume
14 of the Journal of the Legal Writing Institute, which published several articles arising from
presentations at that conference), and the second at the Lewis and Clark Law School, Portland,
OR, in June, 2009. Both of these conferences brought together a mix of traditional casebook,
clinical and legal writing faculty from around the world to discuss the role of stories in legal
practice.
In addition, legal scholars are starting to examine the neuroscience of how persuasion works.
In particular, Prof. Kathryn M. Stanchi of Temple University has written several excellent
articles on this subject. See, e.g., Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial
Exploration, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 411 (2006); Stanchi, Playing with Fire: The Science of
Confronting Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 Rutgers L. Rev. 381 (2008); Stanchi, The
Persuasive Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science of First Impressions to
Persuade the Reader [manuscript on file with the author]; see also Ruth Anne Robbins and Steve
Johansen, This is your Brain on Stories (Presentation to Applied Legal Storytelling Conference,
Lewis and Clark Law School, July 23, 2009) (copy of Powerpoint presentation on file with the
author).
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than the rule of law.91 They may claim that allowing or encouraging judges to respond to
stories will give license to judges to indulge their personal ideological preferences and
predispositions. They may reason that to preserve uniformity, consistency and fairness,
judges should disregard the “story,” and rule based only upon logic and legal reasoning.
Much has been written about this topic, and much more remains to be written. For
my part, I would observe first that pure “legal reasoning” can go only so far; some judicial
decisions require a very fact-specific inquiry.92 (For example, virtually all rules of “law”

91

The familiar concept that the judicial system should strive for the “rule of law” rather than the
“rule of man” is often attributed to Aristotle. See, e.g., Eric G. Zahnd, The Application of
Universal Laws To Particular Cases: A Defense of Equity in Aristotelianism and Anglo-American
Law, 59 Law & Contemp. Probs. 263, 266 (1996) (quoting Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
1129019-25 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985)).

92

Indeed, even Aristotle himself seems to acknowledge that there are some things that judges must
decide which cannot be decided by strict resort to legal doctrine:
And at this day there are magistrates, for example judges, who have authority to decide
some matters which the law is unable to determine, since no one doubts that the law
would command and decide in the best manner whatever it could. But some things can,
and other things cannot, be comprehended under the law, and this is the origin of the
vexed question whether the best law or the best man should rule. For matters of detail
about which men deliberate cannot be included in legislation. Nor does any one deny that
the decision of such matters must be left to man, but it is argued that there should be
many judges, and not one only.
Aristotle, Politics, in 9 Great Books of the Western World (Robert Maynard Hutchins, ed.,
Benjamin Jowet, trans., Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., William Benton 1952) (n.d.), at 485-86.
Artistotle expanded on this concept in his Nichomachean Ethics:
The reason is that all law is universal but about some things it is not possible to make a
universal statement which shall be correct. In those cases, then, in which it is necessary
to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the law takes the usual case,
though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error. And it is none the less correct; for the
error is not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature of the thing, since the matter
of practical affairs is of this kind from the start. When the law speaks universally, then,
and a case arises on it which is not covered by the universal statement, then it is right,
where the legislator fails us and has erred by oversimplicity, to correct the omission - to
say what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have put
into his law if he had known. Hence the equitable is just, and better than one kind of
justice - not better than absolute justice but better than the error that arises from the
absoluteness of the statement. And this is the nature of the equitable, a correction of law
where it is defective owing to its universality. In fact this is the reason why all things are
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that require the application of a balancing test require judges to weigh different factors, a
process that does not lend itself well to formulaic and rigid “logical” rules.93) Second, such
an argument assumes that “stories” somehow trigger inappropriate political or ideological
responses in the reader. However, recall the definition of story that I propose brief-writers
should employ: “a detailed, character-based narration of a character’s struggles to
overcome obstacles and reach an important goal.”94 There is nothing inherently political95
or ideological about that definition. Characters of all political stripes struggle to overcome
obstacles, and the obstacles can be of any nature. In fact, this definition of a story talks
about story structure, not story content.96
Kendall Haven, who authored the definition of story that I have used here, contends
that the principal benefits of a “good story” is that it commands the listener’s (or reader’s)
attention.97 (As I routinely tell my students as they begin to write their appellate briefs, it
is impossible to persuade a judge who is asleep.) Stories also provide the structure that

not determined by law, that about some things it is impossible to lay down a law, so that
a decree is needed.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 9 Great Books of the Western World (Robert Maynard
Hutchins, ed., W.D. Ross trans., Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., William Benton 1952) (n.d.), at
pp. 23-24.
93

See discussion at n. 21, supra.

94

See n. 33 and accompanying text, supra.

95

By this I mean”political” in the traditional sense of “liberal” or “conservative” biases (or any other
axis one might choose). Stories often are “political” in the sense that they can be used for political
purposes; I merely mean to suggest that they are not political because both sides of any divide
can equally use stories to make whatever points they choose to make.

96

“Story is a way of structuring information, a system of informational elements that most
effectively create the essential context and relevance that engages receivers and enhance
memory and the creation of meaning.” Haven, supra n. 11, at 15 [emphasis in original].

97

Id. at 8.

-47-

helps listeners remember a story longer than they would remember a less-structured
narrative.98 Stories also improve logical thinking.99 All of these things are important aids to
how judges receive and process a lawyer’s arguments on behalf of a client; and they are
value-neutral.
This is why I agree with Scalia & Garner’s suggestion that it is permissible to
include some legally irrelevant, yet emotionally suggestive, facts in an appellate brief.100
Stories rely on such facts. The writer’s goal in an appellate brief is to persuade. Persuasion
is best when it comes from within.101 A writer cannot tell somebody how to feel, but if a
feeling arises within a reader, apparently “unbidden,” then the reader will perceive it as
“real” and inherently believable. If those feelings then form the basis for the “first
impression” as to how the case should come out, the writer has created a condition in which
persuasion is possible. The writer’s job therefore is to tell the client’s story in such a way
that these feelings are likely to emerge from within the reader; from that reader’s “deep
frame.” If, however, the writer uses highly charged, emotional prose, the reader will see
what the writer is up to, will feel manipulated, and will resist.102 As Scalia & Garner
suggest, that can provoke “a nasty backlash” against the writer.103
Focusing on the story of the case is the most likely route to finding that sweet spot

98

Id. at 69-72.

99

Id. at 98-104.

100

Scalia & Garner, supra n. 13, at 32 and 94.

101

“People value their own conclusions more highly than yours. They will only have faith in a story
that has become real for them personally.” Simmons, supra n. 33, at 3.

102

See Simmons, id., at 4 (“Frankly, manipulation is an inferior method of influence.”)

103

Scalia & Garner, supra n. 13 at 32.
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where a deep frame is activated (becoming the foundation of persuasion) without being so
obvious that the reader’s natural defenses are triggered. Stories are natural; they are the
way humans have communicated and learned for thousands of years. And, as my study
suggests, stories work.
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